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abstract
This paper highlights the importance of product differentiation and endogenous r&d in 
determining the optimal r&d policy, in a model where investment in cost reducing r&d is 
committed before firms compete in a differentiated-goods third-country export market. R&D 
is always taxed in oligopolies for high degrees of product differentiation. For lower degrees 
of product differentiation the duopoly is subsidized or the government remains inactive. in 
contrast, the monopoly is always subsidized. The government with a duopoly may be ac-
tive or inactive depending on the degree of product differentiation. Thus, we may observe a 
reversal in the sign of the optimal r&d policy if the degree of product differentiation changes 
or, alternatively, if there is a change in the number of firms. Similar qualitative results hold if 
trade policy uses output subsidies, instead of r&d promotion.
Keywords: product differentiation, strategic trade policy, policy reversals, r&d subsidies, 
monopoly, duopoly.
JEL classification: F12, F13, l13.
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1 Introduction
This paper highlights the importance of product dierentiation and endogenous
sunk costs in international trade policy. In our model rms rst invest in R&D
and then compete in a dierentiated goods market in a third country. The
results for R&D subsidies (for the well studied domestic monopoly) do not
extend when the domestic and/or foreign market has a duopoly and products
are dierentiated. They are robust for domestic monopolies, but not so in
three contexts: First, when the rms spend on cost reducing R&D before the
market competition stage; second, when the product market is dierentiated;
third, when there is a duopoly in the home or foreign market. Depending on
these, the optimal R&D subsidy could be positive, negative, or governments
may even choose inaction as an optimal policy.
The model of two domestic monopolies competing in a third market (Bran-
der and Spencer, 1985) has been criticized for want of robustness. The main
result from this model is that unilateral trade policy is benecial and bilateral
policy has the characteristics of a prisoners’ dilemma. Several authors have
argued that imposing output subsidies is not a robust policy in the context
of this model (for example, see Eaton and Grossman, 1986 and Dixit, 1984).
Further, Helpman and Krugman (1994) conjecture that a reasonable policy
should be a tax under both Cournot and Bertrand competition. An exception
to this is the recent study by Kujal and Ruiz (2007) who demonstrate that
output subsidies are robust to changes in market competition if a prior R&D
stage is included in a model with dierentiated goods1. On the other hand,
it is generally believed that R&D subsidies are far more robust than output
subsidies2.
In this paper it is shown that a monopoly’s R&D is always subsidized.
However, this optimal policy changes when there is duopoly in the exporting
industry. A duopoly’s R&D is always taxed for high degrees of product dif-
ferentiation. This qualitative outcome is independent of the number of rms
in the other exporting country. Industrial policy thus depends on the market
structure with a monopoly emerging as a special case.
Why R&D is taxed for a domestic oligopoly is easy to understand. It is to
be noted that the prot shifting eect in the third market model applies only
1They show that for su!ciently cost eective R&D governments subsidize exports inde-
pendently of the mode of competition. This result holds under both output and price com-
petition for linear demands and constant marginal costs. Note that Brander (1995) shows
that the results from the strategic trade literature can be extended to models with product
dierentiation. These models, however, have no prior R&D stage.
2Bagwell and Staiger (1994) show that R&D subsidy towards monopolies is robust to the
nature of market competition.
banco de españa 10 docUMento de traBaJo n.º 001
to domestic monopolies. A subsidy towards a domestic monopoly shifts its
reaction function to the Stackelberg (leader) point, thus increasing its prots.
This, however, does not happen if there is oligopoly in the domestic market.
A subsidy to both rms shifts both reaction functions out. However, due to
competition among themselves in the third market, they are producing too
much from the perspective of joint prot maximization. The advantage of
unilaterally achieving the Stackelberg point under domestic monopoly is thus
lost under duopoly. The optimal policy in this case is thus a tax for a su!ciently
low degree of product dierentiation. The optimal tax eectively restricts
excessive competition among domestic exporters.
Similar results are obtained for output subsidies. A monopoly is subsidized
and a duopoly is taxed for higher degrees of product dierentiation. The only
dierence is that the multiple equilibria observed under R&D subsidies for the
intermediate degree of product dierentiation are not observed under output
subsidies. The results obtained here show few dierences between R&D and
output subsidies if the degree of product dierentiation is high. Besides, the
results are robust to price or quantity competition.
By including the R&D stage prior to market competition, one can capture
the fundamental aspect of entry barriers in oligopolistic industries. The prior
R&D stage captures investment in the long run that has strategic value for
rms (see Grossman, 1988; Sutton, 1992; and Herguera, Kujal and Petrakis,
2000 and 2002). As argued by Grossman (1988), rm investment in quality or
innovation has commitment value and should have a marked eect not only on
market competition but also on the choice of trade policy instruments. This
aspect of modeling oligopolies has not been studied fully in international trade.
In fact, the results obtained here hinge on this assumption. The optimal
policy in this case depends upon the net eect of the two stages and not solely
on the strategic complementarity or substitutability of the variables in the
market competition stage. Kujal and Ruiz (2007) highlight the importance
of rm investment in a prior R&D stage. They show that by doing so the
classic policy reversal result is not observed. In their model, the sign of the
optimal output subsidy depends on the net eect of the export subsidy on
R&D and the market competition stage. This is unlike the model with no
R&D where the sign of the strategic trade policy depends only on the strategic
complementarity or substitutability of the variables chosen by rms in the
market competition stage. Under R&D and Cournot competition, unilateral
export subsidy increases welfare through its eect both on R&D and output.
This means that governments want to subsidize exports (Spencer and Brander,
1983). Under Bertrand competition, however, the two eects have the opposite
sign. If R&D is su!ciently cost-eective, then it will be rather elastic with
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respect to an export subsidy. The high elasticity of R&D makes the eect of
the output subsidy on the R&D stage stronger than the eect on the price
competition stage. In this case, governments subsidize output under Bertrand
competition. Conversely, if R&D is not su!ciently cost-eective, then the
eect of output subsidy on the price competition stage dominates the eect on
the R&D stage and hence the optimal policy under Bertrand competition is to
tax output.
The results obtained here contrast with the general belief that R&D subsi-
dies are more robust than output subsidies and with those of Dixit (1984) for
the case of output subsidies. Dixit contends that the policy instrument does
not change if the number of domestic and foreign rms increases proportionally
across the exporting countries3. That is, if qi is the number of foreign rms,
and qk the number of domestic rms, the sign of the equilibrium subsidy is
equal to the sign of qi + 1  qk. It is to be noted that the optimal policy
depends upon the relative distribution of foreign and domestic rms. When
qi  qk the optimal policy is always a subsidy or otherwise a tax. As in the
case of R&D subsidies, and unlike Dixit (1984), it is shown here that a propor-
tional increase in the number of rms at home and abroad alters the optimal
trade policy instrument for both domestic and foreign governments. Further,
oligopolies are always taxed for high levels of product dierentiation.
Our results are along the lines suggested by Helpman and Krugman (1994).
They argue that the best policy is the one that maximizes welfare and argue ,
“..that the case for export subsidies is very fragile indeed (p. 102).” Even for
duopolies, the results are along similar lines, but product dierentiation also
plays an important role in determining the sign of the optimal policy.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, the
specic model under free trade is solved. In section 3, government incentives
to tax or subsidize R&D under Cournot competition in a third market are
analyzed. In Section 4 we briey discuss results for output subsidies. Section
5 concludes.
2 Free trade
For this study, a third-country model with one or two rms located in two
dierent countries is used. Firms produce a dierentiated good, which they sell
in a third country. Denote by qk the number of rms in the home country and
by qi the number in the foreign country, and let q = qk+qi = Further, there is
a competitive numeraire sector. Firms operate under constant returns to scale
3Also see Bhagwati et al.(1998, p. 397). Brander (1995) shows that the results hold for a
third market model.
banco de españa 12 docUMento de traBaJo n.º 001
and initially have the same marginal costs of production f= They can invest
{2
2 in a cost saving technology prior to engaging in market competition and
reduce their marginal cost by = All rms face symmetric demand functions.
Consumers maximize utility,
X({1> {2> = = = > {q) = d(
qX
l=1
{l)
1
2
3
C
qX
l=1
{2l + 2
3
CX
l6=m
{l{m
4
D
4
D+p
with p representing money. The parameter [0> 1] measures the degree of
product dierentiation, with lower values of  indicating more dierentiated
products and {l the quantity consumed of good l. Resulting inverse demand
is sl = d {l  (
P
k6=l {k). If rm l is in the home country (l 5 K), then,
{l(p¯) =
d (1 ) sl(1 + (qk + qi  2)) + 
³P
mM{K3l} smk +
P
mMI smi
´
(1 )(1 + (qk + qi  1))
where {l is the output produced by rm l 5 K, sk and si are the prices charged
for the home and foreign varieties of the good, respectively, and
p¯ = {s1k> s2k> = = = > sqkk> s1i > s2i > = = = > sqii}
is the vector of prices.4 Firms play a two-stage game. In stage one, they
simultaneously decide how much to invest in cost-reducing R&D (l) and
in stage two, given the decreased unit cost, they simultaneously compete in
quantities. Thus, rms can use R&D strategically to improve their position
in the subsequent market competition stage, because investment in R&D has
commitment value. We look for the subgame perfect equilibria of the game.
2.1 Quantity competition
In the quantity competition stage, rm l chooses {l to maximize prots, given
inverse demand, sl = d{l(
P
mM{KI3l} {m)> and unit costs, (fl)= Firm
l solves:
max
{l
5
7(d {l  
3
C X
mM{KI3l}
{m
4
D (fl)
6
8{l  
2
l
2
4Note that there are qk varieties of the home good and qi varieties of the foreign good,
each with a (potentially) dierent price.
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with {mM{KI3l} and l taken as given. Each rm’s reaction function is thus
given by
{l(x3l) =
1
2
3
Cd f+l  
3
C X
mM{KI3l}
{m
4
D
4
D > for all l 5 {K ^ I}
The slope of each reaction function is negative, and decreases in the degree of
product dierentiation. The intersection of the q(= qk+qi ) reaction functions
gives equilibrium quantities x = {{1k> {2k> = = = > {qkk> {1i > {2i > = = = > {qii}, each
chosen given the output of the other rm. Equilibrium output and prots (as
a function of rst-stage R&D expenditures) are:
{ˆl(;) =
(d f)(2 ) + (2 + (qi + qk  2))l  
³P
mM{KI3l}m
´
(2 )(2 + (qi + qk  1))
ˆl(;) =
5
7(d f)(2 ) + (2 + (qi + qk  2))l  
³P
mM{KI3l}m
´
(2 )(2 + (qi + qk  1))
6
8
2

2
l
2
= (1)
2.2 R&D Stage
In the R&D stage rm l, given3l>chooses l to maximize its prots (dened
above). Reaction Functions in R&D expenditures are given by
l(3l) =
2[2 + (q 2)]
³
(d f)(2 ) 
³P
mM{KI3l}m
´´
8 + [(4 2) + q2[2 (4 )] 16] 2q[(4 )(2 )  4]
where q = qk + qi = Using symmetry, one can easily solve the system of q
reaction functions to derive the equilibrium level of R&D spending for each
rm:
W() =
2(d f)[2 + (q 2)]
4 [8 6q 2(q 3)(q 1) + 2(q 1)2] >
Replacing the expression above in (1) we obtain rms’ equilibrium prots.
W() = (d f)2 ((d f)(2 )[2 + (q 1)])
2  2 ((d f)[2 + (q 2)])2
(4 [8 6q 2(q 3)(q 1) + 2(q 1)2])2
=
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Note that a rm has greater incentives to invest in cost-reducing R&D
under Cournot competition than under a pure cost-minimizing strategy. This
is due to the positive strategic eect of R&D on prots.
3 R&D subsidies
The R&D subsidies towards a monopoly and duopoly under output competition
are studied in this section5. We continue to assume rms in two countries that
sell a dierentiated good in a third market, and introduce a stage, previous to
R&D choice, where governments in exporting countries simultaneously decide
to engage or not in active R&D policy. Governments that have decided to
engage in active policy then simultaneously commit to a subsidy (positive or
negative) to R&D. Given the policy announcement of both governments, rms
choose the prot maximizing level of R&D in the second stage. In the nal
stage rms compete in quantities.
The results for R&D policy for bilateral duopolies under Cournot competi-
tion are presented rst. This allows one to introduce the basic model with R&D
subsidies. After this, the case of domestic monopolies is presented. Finally, we
study the asymmetric case of a monopoly in one country and a duopoly in the
other.6
3.1 Bilateral duopolies
First we present the results where only one government pursues an active R&D
policy, while the other remains inactive. After this, the results of the case in
which both countries choose an R&D subsidy are presented, and then the
equilibrium choice of R&D subsidies characterized. Starting with the case in
which only the home government pursues an active R&D policy, the domestic
(k) and the foreign (i) rms’ prot maximization problem is solved in the
quantity competition stage:
5Results for Bertrand competition are available in Kujal and Ruiz (2003). The qualitative
results regarding government policy do not change with respect to Cournot competition.
6Notice that in a two-stage game, one cannot make the convenient symmetry assumption
on output that is conventional in one-stage games. One needs to explicitly solve for the
reaction functions for each rm and then solve the problem in the R&D stage. It has not
been possible in this study to nd explicit solutions for the case of many rms in each country
owing to analytical complexity. Hence, only the problem of domestic duopolies is solved.
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max
{k
5
7(d {k  
3
C X
mM{KI3l}
{m
4
D (fk)
6
8{k  (1 }k)
2
k
2
max
{i
5
7(d {i  
3
C X
mM{KI3l}
{m
4
D (fi )
6
8{i 
2i
2
=
where }k is the subsidy to R&D expenditures. From the rst order conditions,
we obtain the reaction functions
{l(x3l) =
1
2
3
Cd f+l  
3
C X
mM{KI3l}
{m
4
D
4
D > for all l 5 {K ^ I} (2)
Note that the reaction functions under R&D subsidy are the same as under free
trade. This is because only the R&D subsidy enters the rst order conditions
in the nal stage. As before, under free trade, the intersection of the qk +
qi reaction functions gives the vector of equilibrium quantities, each chosen
given the output of the other rm. It is easy to see in Eq. (2) that the
derivative g{lg{3l decreases in  and becomes zero for  = 0= This shows that, as
goods become more dierentiated, the output shifting eect of the increase in
own production is smaller. Given that the transfer of prots from foreign to
domestic rms, induced by a subsidy, depends on the output shifting eect, the
incentive to subsidize decreases as  gets smaller. This simple intuition (which
also applies to the case of bilateral subsidies) shows that R&D subsidies cannot
be independent of the degree of product dierentiation.7
Solving the system of equations implicit in Eq. (2), the equilibrium output
can be obtained as a function of rst-stage R&D expenditures:
{ˆl(;) =
(d f)(2 ) + (2 + (qi + qk  2))l  
³P
mM{KI3l}m
´
(2 )(2 + (qi + qk  1))
=
(3)
Turning now to the R&D stage, equilibrium quantities are substituted into
rm’s prots to solve for the equilibrium R&D under unilateral subsidies. The
following reaction functions are obtained for the domestic and foreign rms,
respectively.
7 It is to be noted that, besides the prot shifting eect, the government also has an
incentive to limit excess competition between rms (Helpman and Krugman, 1994). This
point will be discussed later in the paper.
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kl(3kl) =
4(1 + ) ((d f)(2 )  (km +i1 +i2))
8 }k(2 )2(2 + 3)2  (16 (16 + 3(8 3)))
(4)
il(3il) =
4(1 + ) ((d f)(2 )  (k1 +k2 +im))
8 (16 (16 + 3(8 3))) > l 6= m> l> m = 1> 2=
(5)
This gives the following equilibrium R&D for the domestic and the foreign
rms.
Wk() =
4(1 + )(d f)(4 + (10 3)2)
D()
Wi () =
4(1 + )(d f)(4 + (10 3)2 + }k(2 )2(2 + 3))
D()
where, D() = (4 + 2(10 + 3))(4 + (16 + 3(2 + 3)))  }k(2 +
)2(2 + 3)(8 + (20 + 3(4 + (8 + 3)))=
Finally, in the rst stage, equilibrium R&D is substituted into the denition
of total welfare for exporting country l thus:
Z =
2P
l=1
(Wl (
W
l ) }k
W2l (; }k)
2
)= (6)
Using the foregoing expressions the welfare-maximizing unilateral tax is given
by
}Wk = 
(8 + (4 + (28 + 3(8 + 3(8 + 3)))))
(2 )(2 + 3)(4 + (2 + )(4 + 3)) =
It is worth noting here that the optimal subsidy is independent of market
size (df) and marginal costs. We focus only on the levels of product dieren-
tiation that provide interior solutions. In the case of unilateral R&D subsidies
this would be true for 8  ? 0=665703. Figure 1 (left) depicts the optimal R&D
subsidy }Wk for dierent degrees of product dierentiation (). From the gure
it is clear that the optimal policy depends on the degree of product dierentia-
tion. In particular, R&D is taxed for high levels of product dierentiation (i.e.
 ? 0=514708) and subsidized for low levels of product dierentiation. Thus,
a model that abstracts from product dierentiation and focuses only on the
special case of a (local) monopoly (i.e. low ) may not be a reliable guide for
policy making.
8This range ensures that output, R&D and welfare are positive.
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10.514708
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0.1
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
R&D subs.
Unilateral
Subsidies
0.514708
J
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
R&D subs.
Bilateral
Subsidies
Figure 1: R&D subsidies in the case of two duopolies. Left: Unilateral subsidy
when the foreign government commits to remain inactive. Right: Bilateral
subsidies when both governments are active.
It is clear that a unilateral R&D policy always increases welfare over free
trade because the country always has the option to set a zero subsidy. Welfare
of the country that decides against engaging itself in R&D policy (henceforth
the inactive country) increases if the unilateral policy of the rival government
is to tax. The tax reduces the production of the taxing country and increases
the prots of the exporter in the inactive country. In the case of a unilateral
subsidy the eects are reversed.
Turning now to the case where both countries commit to using R&D policies
(bilateral subsidies), the rm’s problem in the quantity competition stage is
solved
max
{l
5
7(d {l  
3
C X
mM{KI3l}
{m
4
D (fl)
6
8{l  (1 }l)
2
l
2
and obtain output reaction functions obtained as in Eq. (2), which translate
into equilibrium outputs as in (3). Substituting equilibrium quantities into the
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equation describing prots we obtain,
ˆl(;) =
5
7(d f)(2 ) + (2 + (qi + qk  2))l  
³P
mM{KI3l}m
´
(2 )(2 + (qi + qk  1))
6
8
2
(1 }l)
2l
2
=
Maximizing ˆl(;) with respect to l> we obtain the reaction functions
for the domestic and foreign rms. These are exactly the same as in Eq. (4)
for the home rms (and analogously for the foreign rms, which now subsidize
a fraction }i of R&D expenditures). The intersection of the q(= qk + qi )
reaction functions gives the equilibrium R&D expenditures as a function of .
Given the R&D level chosen by the rms, government l chooses }l to maximize
total welfare in Eq. (6). This gives the equilibrium bilateral R&D subsidies
thus:
}Wl =
2 + 2  32  (1 + )
p
((2 (4 ))(2 + 3(4 + 3)))
((2 + )(2 + )(2 + 3)
Again, the focus is on 0 ?  ? 0=586505 to obtain interior solutions. Figure
1 (right) shows that if both countries engage in active policy, they tax R&D
for high degrees of product dierentiation ( ? 0=514708); otherwise, they
subsidize it. As in the case of unilateral subsidies, equilibrium R&D values can
be substituted in Eq. (6) to obtain total welfare under bilateral R&D subsidies.
Proposition 1 describes the equilibrium of the R&D policy game for bilat-
eral duopolies. R&D is taxed for high degrees of product dierentiation and
unilaterally subsidized for low degrees of dierentiation.
Proposition 1 (R&D subsidies for bilateral duopolies) Restricting atten-
tion to interior solutions ( ? 0=586505), the equilibrium of the policy game
with two exporters in each country is as follows:
• For  ? 0=514708 both countries tax R&D.
• For 0=514708 ?  ? 0=586505 there are two equilibria. In each equilib-
rium, one country subsidizes R&D while the other does not engage in
active trade policy.
Proof: It is argued earlier that if a foreign government is not engaged in active
policy, then the home government always prefers to be unilaterally active. If
the other country is active, then the home country is active if  ? 0=514708 (as
welfare is bigger than remaining unilaterally inactive), but inactive otherwise
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(0=514708 ?  ? 0=586505) (see gure. 2). As the policy game is symmetric,
there are two equilibria for the latter range. This proves the structure of the
equilibria claimed in the proposition.
As regards the sign of the active policy, it can be seen that, under bi-
lateral policy ( ? 0=514708), both countries tax (see gure 1, right). For
0=514708 ?  ? 0=585998> the equilibrium involves a unilateral policy and the
active country imposes a subsidy (see gure. 1, left).
0.514708
J
0.96
0.98
1.02
1.04
wf unicccccccc cccccccc
wf bil
Relative
Welfare
Figure 2: R&D subsidies for bilateral duopolies: Welfare for a unilaterally
inactive government (zi xql) vs. welfare for a bilateral subsidy (zi elo).
As suggested by Helpman and Krugman (1994), rms are taxed for bilateral
duopolies. We, however, nd that this holds good only for high degrees of
product dierentiation. On the other hand, a policy reversal (to a unilateral
R&D subsidy) is observed for lower degrees of product dierentiation.
The eect of an R&D policy on R&D investment and its consequent eect
on output (and hence prices and prots) helps one in understanding the con-
icting eects at play. Under bilateral duopolies, the tax on R&D decreases
R&D expenditure of all rms in both markets. This softens overinvestment in
R&D as a result of which the rms’ output decreases and the prices and prots
increase. Thus, a cooperative solution would involve both governments taxing
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R&D. Contrarily, it is well known that unilateral incentives to subsidize R&D
do exist as they help domestic rms achieve the Stackelberg leader position.
This eect increases output and transfers prots from foreign rms.
However, in the case of a domestic duopoly, the government also wants to
curtail excessive competition among domestic rms that export to the third
market. A standard result from Cournot markets, with more than one rm
at home, is that rms produce too much in terms of joint prots. Therefore,
to ameliorate this negative domestic externality the government chooses to tax
the domestic oligopoly. Helpman and Krugman (1994) advance a similar view
by arguing that a tax achieves tacit collusion between the rms as it reduces
R&D and output, and increases prices and prots. It is shown here that under
high degrees of product dierentiation this domestic restraint eect dominates
the prot shifting eect.
Graphically, under domestic duopoly, R&D subsidy shifts the reaction func-
tion of all the domestic rms. If the output of a domestic rm is on the hor-
izontal axis and the aggregate output of all the others (including the other
domestic rms) on the vertical axis, then it can be seen that the subsidy shifts
the reaction function of not only the domestic rm but also of all other rms
in the market. With both reaction functions shifting out it is easy to see that
lower prots are achieved. Hence, the prot transfer eect of a subsidy on
duopolies is outweighed by the negative externality of excessive competition
among domestic rms. As a result, regardless of the relative distribution of
rms, duopolies are always taxed for high degrees of product dierentiation.
However, as the degree of product dierentiation decreases, the prot shifting
eect dominates and governments feel encouraged to subsidize R&D.
The case of a monopoly in each country will now be discussed to show how
the optimal R&D policy is modied.
3.2 Bilateral monopolies
We briey present the results for a monopoly in each country. The focus
is on the degree of product dierentiation for which an interior solution is
obtained under an R&D subsidy, i.e.  ? 0=663916 under unilateral policy and
 ? 0=585998 under bilateral policy.9 The following Proposition 2 shows that,
with two monopolies, R&D is subsidized. However, the decision to subsidize
R&D (as opposed to remain inactive) depends on product dierentiation. If
the degree of product dierentiation is high, both countries subsidize R&D; if
it is low two equilibria exist in which only one country subsidizes.
9These restrictions ensure that output and R&D investment are positive.
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Proposition 2 (R&D subsidies for bilateral monopolies) Restricting to
interior solutions ( ? 0=585998), and when there is one exporter in each coun-
try, the equilibrium of the policy game when is as follows:
• For  ? 0=427853> both countries subsidize R&D.
• For 0=427853 ?  ? 0=585998> there are two equilibria. In each equi-
librium, one country subsidizes R&D while the other does not engage in
active trade policy.
Proof: As argued in the previous section, the government always has an in-
centive to engage in active trade policy if the other country is inactive. The
active government subsidizes R&D (gure 3, left) and if both countries en-
gage in active policy, then both of them subsidize R&D (gure 3, right). For
 ? 0=427853, both countries subsidize, because welfare under bilateral subsi-
dies is bigger than welfare obtained by remaining inactive unilaterally (gure
4). However, for  A 0=427853> one government prefers to remain inactive if
the other commits to engage itself in R&D policy.
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Figure 3: R&D subsidies in the case of two monopolies. Left: Unilateral sub-
sidy when the foreign government remains inactive. Right: Bilateral subsidies
when both governments are active.
It is worth noting that, contrary to Spencer and Brander (1983) and Bag-
well and Staiger (1994), governments do not always subsidize R&D for domestic
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Figure 4: R&D subsidies for bilateral monopolies: Welfare for a unilaterally
inactive government (zi xql) vs. welfare for a bilateral subsidy (zi elo).
monopolies. We nd that bilateral subsidies to R&D (instead of one govern-
ment committing not to intervene) are observed only for su!ciently small .
3.3 Monopoly versus a duopoly
We now analyze the case in which the home country (k) has a monopoly and
the foreign country (i) a duopoly. Focusing on interior solutions, the analysis
would be restricted to  ? 0=627557 for unilateral, and  ? 0=587535 for bilat-
eral policy. The following proposition shows that the government with duopoly
either taxes R&D or remains inactive. The government with monopoly, on the
other hand, either subsidizes R&D or remains inactive10:
Proposition 3 (R&D subsidies for a monopoly vs. a duopoly) Restricting
to interior solutions, that is,  ? 0=587535 and when there is a home monopoly
(qk = 1) and a foreign duopoly (qi = 2)> the equilibrium of the policy game is
as follows:
• For  ? 0=273545, both countries engage in active R&D policies: the
10 It can be veried that a domestic monopoly is always subsidized when the number of
foreign rms increases.
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foreign country (with duopoly) taxes R&D while the home country (with
monopoly) subsidizes it.
• For 0=273545 ?  ? 0=531453, the foreign government taxes R&D while
the home government remains inactive.
• For 0=531453 ?  ? 0=587535, there would be two equilibria:
— Equilibrium I: The foreign government taxes R&D and the home
government is inactive.
— Equilibrium II: The foreign government is inactive and the home
government subsidizes R&D.
Proof: As argued earlier, if a government does not engage itself in active policy
then the other government prefers to be active. The country with monopoly
always subsidizes R&D (gure 5, left) and the one with duopoly taxes R&D
for  ? 0=611472, and subsidizes it otherwise (gure 5, right).
What would be the best response of the other active country? If the country
with monopoly is active, then the government with duopoly wants to be active
too for  ? 0=531453, and on other instances inactive. This can be seen in
gure 6 (left), which shows that welfare under bilateral subsidies is bigger than
welfare obtained by remaining inactive unilaterally for low . Similarly, if the
country with two rms is active, then the country with monopoly wants to be
active if  ? 0=273545, and inactive otherwise (see gure 6, right).
Putting together these reaction functions, one can obtain the structure of
the equilibrium in the proposition. In the case of a bilateral active policy
( ? 0=273545), the country with one rm subsidizes R&D (see gure 7, left)
while the one with two rms taxes it (gure 7, right).
Thus, a country with monopoly subsidizes R&D, while the one with duopoly
taxes it. However, for some degrees of product dierentiation, both may not be
active at the same time in equilibrium. This rea!rms that policy choice cannot
be independent of the degree of product dierentiation, market structure and
the nature of (endogenous) sunk costs.
The results in this section show that the sign of the optimal R&D policy is
sensitive to both the distribution of rms in the two exporting countries and to
the degree of product dierentiation, though in a non-linear way in some cases.
Propositions 1 and 3 show that R&D by a duopoly is taxed for high degrees of
product dierentiation and subsidized for lower degrees of dierentiation. In
contrast, a monopoly is always subsidized. This result is in stark contrast to
that of Dixit (1984) who nds that the optimal output subsidy does not change
if the relative number of rms remains the same. One may observe a reversal
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Figure 5: Unilateral R&D subsidies in the case of monopoly vs a duopoly.
Left: unilateral subsidy for a monopolist when the foreig government commits
to remain inactive. Right: unilateral subsidy for a duopolist.
in the sign of the optimal R&D policy if the degree of product dierentiation
changes (keeping the number of rms unaltered in each exporting country) or,
alternatively, if there is a change in the number of rms (holding xed the
degree of product dierentiation).
4 Output subsidies
As a straightforward extension of the model in the previous section, one can
study the choice of output subsidies. In particular, assume an output subsidy
vk that reduces marginal costs. Thus, the prot maximization problem of the
rm is given by:
max
{k
5
7(d {k  
3
C X
mM{KI3l}
{m
4
D (f vk k)
6
8{k  
2
k
2
Following similar steps as in the previous section11, one can derive the
equilibrium output subsidy. The main dierence from R&D policy is that
multiple equilibria do not exist with output subsidies. When both countries
have a monopoly, the optimal policy (in the range where interior solutions
11Details of the optimal choice of output subsidies can be seen in Kujal and Ruiz (2003).
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Figure 6: Monopoly vs a duopoly: Welfare for a unilaterally inactive gov-
ernment zi xql vs. for a bilateral subsidy zi elo. Left: government with a
duopoly. Right: government with a monopoly.
exist) is always an output subsidy, as emphasized by Kujal and Ruiz (2007).
However, it is to be noted that R&D is assumed to be fully eective at cost
reduction, in what constitutes a special case of a more general model12.
In the case where there are duopolies in each country, the optimal policy for
both governments is taxing if the degree of product dierentiation is high, and
subsidizing if dierentiation is for an intermediate range of . Interestingly,
the optimal policy choice under this scenario, according to Dixit (1984), would
always be a subsidy, because in his model the sign of the policy is the same as
qi + 1 qk A 0= Moreover, unlike Helpman and Krugman (1994), our results
suggest that taxing may not always be an optimal policy, because governments
would optimally subsidize for low product dierentiation. The reason is similar
to the case of R&D subsidies: for high degrees of product dierentiation, the
prot shifting eect is small and the negative externality of excessive compe-
tition between the two domestic rms dominates. That is why oligopolies are
taxed. However, for an intermediate range of product dierentiation the prot
shifting eect dominates the negative (output) externality and hence rms are
subsidized.
12 In Kujal and Ruiz (2007), it is shown that policy reversals may still be observed for
low eectiveness of R&D at decreasing marginal costs. When R&D is fully eective, the
special case in this paper, then no policy reversal is observed even when moving to Bertrand
competition.
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Figure 7: Bilateral R&D subsidies in the case of monopoly vs a duopoly. Left:
subsidy for a monopolist. Right: subsidy for a duopolist.
As in the R&D case, for a duopoly in one country and a monopoly in
the other, the duopoly is taxed when the degree of product dierentiation is
high. On the other hand, the government with two rms remains inactive for
intermediate values of  (since qi+1qk = 0 an inactive government is always
the optimal policy in Dixit, 1984), but subsidizes output for high values of .
Independent of the number of foreign rms a domestic monopoly is always
subsidized in a manner similar to Dixit (1984).
Our results show that the use of output subsidies yields the same qualitative
predictions as for R&D subsidies: there could be reversals in the sign of the
optimal policy depending on the degree of product dierentiation or the number
of rms in each country.
5 Conclusion
This study has shown that the optimal R&D and output policy is not only
sensitive to the distribution of rms in the two exporting countries, but also to
the degree of product dierentiation. Bilateral duopolies are taxed for R&D
(or output) for high degrees of product dierentiation and subsidized for lower
degrees of dierentiation. This is in contrast to the nding of Dixit (1984) that
the optimal output subsidy does not change if the relative number of rms
remains the same. Second, increasing the number of rms, in one, or both the
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countries, may change the sign of the optimal policy in a non-monotonic way.
A monopoly’s R&D is always subsidized, whereas a duopoly is always taxed for
high degrees of product dierentiation. Countries may, however, tax, subsidize,
or remain inactive for lower degrees of product dierentiation. R&D is always
taxed for a duopoly when the other country has a monopoly. Therefore, what
matters in policy choice are the distribution of rms and the degree of product
dierentiation.
A government with a domestic duopoly does not have unilateral incentives
to subsidize R&D (or output) owing to the negative externality between do-
mestic rms. An R&D (or output) subsidy shifts the reaction function of all
domestic rms out. Instead of achieving the Stackelberg leader point, a lower
level of prots is attained by both domestic rms. For low degrees of prod-
uct dierentiation, a government may be inactive or even revert policy and
subsidize R&D.
Further, trade policy depends on the number of rms that are present
inside and outside a country. In contrast to Dixit (1984), it is shown here
that the optimal policy does not depend only on the relative asymmetry in the
distribution of rms. Interestingly, in some cases the equilibrium involves a
government remaining inactive, even though its welfare is reduced with respect
to free trade. Thus, retaliation may not always be observed.
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